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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
Recently, some developed countries including Japan have been facing the problems 
of fertility decline and population ageing. In the past 50 years, the worldwide total 
fertility rate (TFR) decreased from 5 to 2.5, and the TFR of developed countries is 
significantly less than 2. As for population ageing, the ratio of the population aged 65 
years and above increased from 4.99% to 8.27% between 1960 and 2015, and it is 
expected to increase to 15.95% by 2050 (World Bank). These two problems are 
expected to cause slower economic growth through a decrease in the future working 
population. Therefore, fertility decline and population ageing are crucial problems for 
developed countries. The purpose of this study is to identify an optimal policy for the 
low fertility and ageing society, and our study conducts some theoretical and empirical 
analyses.  
Japan has been facing the twin problems of low fertility rate and increasing 
unmarried rate since the 1990s. According to Iwasawa (2008), a change in marital 
behavior can explain more than 80% of the change in fertility rate between 2000 and 
2005 in Japan. Therefore, it is thought that the main reason of the fertility decline in 
Japan is marital decline. According to the result of Iwasawa, marital decline will be 
more important as a determinant of fertility than the other factors that affect fertility 
such as labor participation of married females or husbands’ income. Therefore, our 
study is in the context of the positive effect of marital status on fertility. In addition, 
there are some theories of marital behavior (Becker, 1974; Oppenheimer, 1988), and we 
conduct an empirical analysis of marital status in Japan based on these studies in 
Chapter 2. In the analysis, we develop simultaneous equations by including marital 
status and fertility rate to identify the interrelationships among marital status, fertility, 
and other socioeconomic factors by using fixed-effect 2SLS. In addition to higher 
fertility due to an increase in the number of married females, we found that the 
economic conditions of males and male co-residence with parents have positive and 
negative correlations with married rate, respectively.  
Both the household saving rate and elderly household saving rate rapidly decreased 
since the 2000s, and the saving behavior of elderly persons is particularly expected to 
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affect the saving rate trend in an ageing society such as Japan. Therefore, it is important 
to identify the saving behavior of elderly persons, and we conduct a theoretical and 
empirical study of this topic in this chapter. In Chapter 3, we develop a two-period life 
cycle model and analyze the asset accumulation of elderly people in Japan using micro 
data. Our study shows that both health status and bequest motives promote asset 
accumulation. In addition, we show that bequest motives affect asset accumulation in 
unhealthy people but they do not that in healthy people.  
Both educational attainment and life expectancy have increased globally, and there 
is a close relationship between education and longevity. Ben-Porath (1967) showed a 
positive correlation between life expectancy and educational investment. The study 
explained that longer life expectancy increases lifetime working hours and benefits from 
education, so educational investment is promoted through higher educational return. In 
addition, some studies show that educational attainment promotes economic growth, 
and there is a negative correlation between education and fertility rate (Mankiw et al., 
1992; Lee and Mason, 2010; Prettner et al., 2012). Economic growth can be attained by 
higher educational investment even if fertility rate decreases, so educational investment 
is important for particularly developed countries. In Chapter 4, we identify the effect of 
longevity and fertility on education by using country-level panel data and add the adult 
mortality rate into the model of Pretnner et al. (2012). 
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Chapter 2 
An empirical analysis of marital status in Japan 
  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
    Since the 1990s, Japan has been facing the twin problems of low fertility rate and 
increasing unmarried rate. The TFR (total fertility rate) has been decreasing since it 
recorded a post-war low, 1.57 in 1989. The present TFR in Japan is much lower than 
2.09, which is the minimum standard necessary to maintain the current population (1.41 
in 2012)1. The country has also been suffering from an increasing non-marriage rate 
since the 1980s. As for lifetime non-marriage rate (non-marriage rate in the 50-year-old 
group), it recorded 20.14% for males and 10.61% for females in 2010 (national census).  
    There is a close relationship between fertility rate and marital status, and this 
relationship is interdependently decided by various socioeconomic factors. For example, 
Becker (1974) focuses on comparative advantage in household production activities as 
the reason for marriage, and Oppenheimer (1988) shows that recession increases 
asymmetric information regarding the future economic status of men, delaying the 
search for a marriage partner. Sakamoto and Kitamura (2007) focus on the relationship 
between co-residence rate and married rate2. They also demonstrate that parental 
economic conditions positively affect co-residence; however, income transfers from 
parents to their children negatively affect marital behavior.  
    Although many studies examined the relationship among marriage, fertility, and 
other socioeconomic factors, only a few focused on the interdependence of these factors. 
Our study aims to examine this interdependent relationship in Japan through 
simultaneous equations concerning marriage and fertility, which include the following 
                                                     
1 According to the estimate of the National Institute of Population and Security Research, 2012, 
Japan will record the lowest estimates for total fertility rate (1.12) and total population (80 million) 
by 2060. 
2 Here, co-residence implies unmarried adult children staying at their parental house. In Japan, 
unmarried children usually tend to live together with their parents, even though they have grown into 
adulthood. The existence of these unmarried adult children is considered as a social problem. 
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endogenous variables: current male and female married rates, TFR, female regular 
employment rate, number of convenience stores, and male and female co-residence 
rates. First, our study focuses on the positive influence of married rate on fertility rate. 
For female employment and convenience stores, these mean factors promote female 
independence and the ease of singlehood, respectively. We also used co-residence rates 
as factors that reduce the married rate based on Sakamoto and Kitamura (2007)3. For the 
analysis, we used the fixed-effect 2SLS on the data of prefectures in Japan, and we can 
cope with the fixed effect by prefectures and the interrelationship among marital rate, 
fertility, and other factors4.  
    The results show that the female married rate positively affects the fertility rate, 
and female employment and convenience stores have negative correlation with marital 
behavior. Our main findings suggest that economic conditions of males had the most 
positive correlation with marital status, which is consistent with the results of Kitamura 
and Miyazaki (2011). Therefore, it was confirmed that men’s economic stability is 
important in considering the marital status. As for the co-residence rate, we used a 
variable, parents’ economic condition, which was divided into linear and quadratic 
terms. The former had a negative effect on co-residence rate, while the latter had a 
positive effect. This result indicates that unmarried children decide to live together with 
their parents because of parents’ economic condition (poverty as well as affluence).  
    The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature 
review on previous studies regarding marriage and fertility. Section 3 explains the 
simultaneous equation model and the definition of each variable. Section 4 explains the 
empirical results and their interpretations.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the study and 
provides important policy implications. 
  
2.2  Literature Review 
  
    Here, we discuss theoretical and empirical research concerning marriage and 
fertility rates. Theories of marital timing can be broadly divided into examining two 
hypotheses: the women’s independence hypothesis and the assortative mating 
hypothesis.  
                                                     
3 In constructing our model, we also referred to the models of Kato (2002) and Yamaguchi and 
Kinugasa (2014). 
4 Fixed-effect 2SLS is the fixed effect model that includes 2SLS. 
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2.2.1  Relationships between household labor and marital status 
    First, one fundamental theory of marital behavior is Becker’s household production 
theory, which assumes that household utility depends directly not on market goods but 
on the commodities produced by the household. Becker thus explained marital behavior 
based on comparative advantage between the man and the woman in household 
production activities. That is, marriage will occur only if, by specializing in his or her 
optimal role, each household member increases his or her utility (Becker, 1974, 1991).   
    Household labor is an important factor driving the marital behavior of both men 
and women, and some empirical studies focus on differences in time spent on 
housework between married and non-married households (South and Spitze, 1994; 
Gupta, 1999; Baxter, 2005; Baxter, Haynes, and Hewitt, 2010). According to the 
analysis of South and Spitze (1994), never-married men who live independently spend 
modestly more time on all types of housework (including outdoor housework) than 
married men do. On the other hand, Gupta (1999) found that never-married men do 
more significantly more housework (preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, 
etc.) than married men. In addition, divorced or widowed men were found to spend 
more time than married men on housework in all of these studies. However, these 
studies also showed that women tend to increase the amount of housework they do after 
marriage, with the time spent on housework being higher for women than for men, 
regardless of marital status. 
2.2.2  Female independence and the declining economic power of men 
    The female dependence hypothesis is based on household production theory and 
posits that an increase in female education level or income decreases the value of 
marriage, so the marriage rate among women decreases. However, empirical research 
testing this hypothesis has produced little evidence that female independence decreases 
the marriage rate. Cross-sectional analysis with macro data supported the female 
independence hypothesis, but time-series analysis using individuals’ event-history data 
did not (Oppenheimer, 1997). On the other hand, some studies have shown that 
marriage increases with female educational attainment or economic power (Sweeny, 
2002; Fukuda, 2009). Sweeny (2002) undertook an event-history analysis using data 
from the NLS (National Longitudinal Survey) and showed that an increase in female 
economic power increases marriage. Moreover, Fukuda (2009), via event-history 
analysis using data from the LSYA21 (Longitudinal Survey of Young Adults in the 21st 
Century), showed that women’s independence increased marriage in the cohort born 
between 1968 and 1982. 
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    Now, we will consider the assortative mating hypothesis, a theory that focuses on 
the decrease in men’s economic power. The assortative mating hypothesis posits that a 
woman spends time searching for a marriage partner of the same level. According to 
Oppenheimer (1988), in a recession, there can be asymmetric information about the 
future socioeconomic status of marriage partners; this asymmetry makes women spend 
considerable time looking for suitable marriage partners. On the other hand, 
well-educated women have less uncertainty regarding their own income or social status, 
so it is possible that female independence promotes marriage (Oppenheimer, 1988). In 
terms of empirical research concerning assortative mating, Raymo and Iwasawa (2005) 
analyzed the determinants of marriage among Japanese females using Japanese National 
Fertility Survey data. They showed that a decline in the supply of highly educated men 
is the main reason for the decreasing marriage rate among highly educated women. 
    According to some empirical studies, education has a negative effect on marriage 
among men in their early 20s but a positive effect on those in their 30s (Kitamura and 
Miyazaki, 2011; Tian, 2013). For example, Tian (2013) used data from the Chinese 
General Social Survey, 2003 and 2008 waves, to show that an interaction term of 
education and age had a positive effect on the male marriage rate. Kitamura and 
Miyazaki (2011) conducted a group-data probit analysis of marriage using data on cities, 
towns, and villages in Japan. They showed that education decreased marriage among 
males in their 20s to early 30s; starting in the late 30s, however, education promoted 
marriage. These studies suggest that more educated men delay marriage while they are 
enrolled in college but will catch up later on. 
    Many empirical studies focus on not only educational attainment but also 
educational composition of the marriage market, which is an important factor in 
marriage partner searches and first marriage timing (Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2000; 
Çelikaksoy, Nekby, and Rashid, 2010; Choi and Mare, 2012; McClendon, Kuo, and 
Raley, 2014). Lewis and Oppenheimer (2000) analyzed the assortative mating pattern 
taking into consideration the educational composition of the local marriage market, and 
McClendon, Kuo, and Raley (2014) focused on educational concentration by 
occupation. The results showed that educational concentration in the marriage market 
positively affects assortative mating and the age at first marriage, particularly for 
women. Additionally, Çelikaksoy, Nekby, and Rashid (2010) and Choi and Mare (2012) 
analyzed the influence of migration on marital behavior or the pattern of assortative 
mating. 
   The relative income hypothesis, another theory about men’s economic decline, is 
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based on the interaction between the intergenerational income gap and marital status. 
According to Easterlin, a main advocate of the theory, higher economic growth allows 
children to afford better living standards and get married, leaving their parental home. 
On the other hand, lower economic growth makes children choose a stable, wealthier 
life at the parental home (Easterlin, 1980). After Easterlin’s study, additional studies of 
marriage focused on the importance of stable male incomes or employment (Watson and 
MacLanahan, 2010). Particularly, Watson and Maclanahan (2010) analyzed IPUMS 
sample data from the 1980 – 2000 U.S. Censuses, and the results showed that the ratio 
of men’s income to the ideal income affects marital status only for low-income men. 
Last, there are some empirical studies concerning the relationships between marital 
status and female labor participation rate in Japan. Unayama (2012) showed that the 
capacity of nursing school promotes female labor supply in Japan. In addition, Abe 
(2013) shows that female regular employment has caused higher labor participation rate 
in the northern coastal area in Japan. 
2.2.3  Co-residential relationships between adult children and parents 
    Some studies have focused on the interaction between parents’ resources and their 
children’s preferences for marital timing. These studies have argued that parents’ 
socioeconomic status enables them to focus on the quality of their children’s marriages. 
Parents not only decide the ideal marriage age for their children but also control this 
timing using their own resources (Modell, 1980; Waite and Spitze, 1981; Axinn and 
Thornton, 1992). Some analyses of this hypothesis have used children’s ages as a proxy 
for parents’ preferences. On the other hand, Axinn and Thornton (1992) used data on 
actual parents’ opinions regarding the ideal marriage age for their children from a 
questionnaire fielded in the U.S. They found that parents’ resources and opined ideal 
age had a negative effect on the timing of their children’s marriages. The increase in 
adult children who are living with their parents is also an important factor in 
determining marital status, particularly in Japan where these unmarried people are 
called “parasite singles.” Yamada (1999) argued that the shift from higher to lower 
economic growth caused an increase in parasite singles and a greater tendency towards 
late marriage in Japan. This explanation also supports Easterlin’s argument.  
    As for empirical analysis, many studies have showed that parental assets have a 
positive effect on their children’s decision to live together with the parents; these results 
are consistent with the relative income hypothesis (Manacorda and Moretti, 2006; 
Sakamoto and Kitamura, 2007; Iacovou, 2010). According to Manacorda and Moretti 
(2006), the co-residence rate among children and parents is over 80% in Italy. The 
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authors concluded that this was due to parents’ preference for co-residence rather than 
children’s dependence on parents. On the other hand, Iacovou (2010) analyzed the 
determinants of young people’s decisions to leave the parental home in three regions of 
Europe (Nordic, South European, and North European) using the data from the 
European Community Household Panel. The results showed that higher parental 
incomes encourage single children to leave the parental home, which is inconsistent 
with Easterlin’s hypothesis. In addition, parental income had a negative effect on 
children’s likelihood of leaving the parental home to live together with a marriage 
partner only in southern Europe. 
    As for Japanese empirical research, Sakamoto and Kitamura (2007) analyzed 
marriage and co-residence rates among unmarried children and parents in Japan using 
data from the Panel Survey on Household Economics. In order to cope with 
endogeneity between marriage and co-residence, they used pooled sample selection in a 
two-stage probit model. As for the co-residence function, the results showed that 
parental income and home ownership rates positively affect co-residence. On the other 
hand, income transfers from parents to children decrease the probability of marriage for 
all generations. However, the income-transfer effect was not significant in cases where 
parents are of the postwar generation and children are of the post-bubble generation. 
According to the authors, this result indicates that the “parasite singles” theory does not 
hold true for these generations. That is, although children once enjoyed richer lives at 
the parental home instead of marriage, it is possible that unmarried people co-residing 
with their parents are not enjoying comfortable lifestyles at the parental home. 
    In our study, we use “co-residence unmarried” as a variable that represents the 
degree of dependence between unmarried children and their parents. Previous studies 
have shown that these factors have a negative influence on marital status, due to 
children’s dependence on their parents. Our study focuses on not only the relationship 
of dependence between unmarried adult children and their parents but also that between 
poor parents and their children. We examine whether these relationships are valid or not 
by dividing parents’ net monetary assets into a first-degree term and a quadratic term. 
2.2.4  Previous studies on fertility rate  
    First, the studies of Leibenstein (1957) and Becker (1960) can be mentioned as 
theoretical studies regarding fertility rate. From the perspective of microeconomics, 
Leibenstein has explained the cause of lower fertility rate in developed countries as 
follows. The utility of having a child can be divided into consumption utility, labor 
utility, and security utility. The consumption utility indicates parents’ pleasure that is 
12 
 
gained from childcare by treating children as consumer goods. The labor utility assumes 
children as a household production factor and security utility describes children’s 
support for parents’ old age. On the other hand, the disutility of having a child can be 
divided into direct cost and indirect cost: the former is the cost directly related to 
childcare, such as education or preparing a meal, and the latter is the opportunity cost, 
such as temporary retirement or suspension of business.   
    Leibenstein (1957) also stated that the increase in income from economic growth 
decreases labor utility and security utility, in particular. That is, the stability in living 
standard or social security would decrease the demand for children’s support after 
retirement. Economic growth would increase the cost of childcare and promote female 
employment, increasing both direct and indirect costs. This explains the lower fertility 
rate in developed countries. Next, Becker attempted to clarify the fertility behavior by 
applying Leibenstein’s theory to the theory of consumer behavior. Becker (1960) has 
focused on children’s quantity (the number of children) and quality (human capital of 
children), and this model is known as the Quality-Quantity Model. The model assumed 
that the quality income elasticity of demand for children is larger than the quantity 
income elasticity. That is, higher income encourages parents to increase human capital 
of children through education rather than increase the number of children. Based on this 
assumption, Becker has theoretically shown the reason for the lower fertility rate in 
developed countries5.     
 
2.3  Model and Data 
 
2.3.1  Interdependence model of marital status and socioeconomic 
factors 
    We construct an interdependence model with marriage, fertility rate, and other 
socioeconomic factors in Japan as variables. We also make a quantitative analysis based 
on these variables. This interdependence model comprises 7 endogenous variables and 
15 exogenous variables. Particularly, endogenous variables include current male and 
female married rates, female regular employment rate, fertility rate, the number of 
                                                     
5 Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008) identified the relationship among socioeconomic status, fertility, 
and economic growth theoretically. As for the empirical analysis, Hashim and Mok (2013) analyzed 
age at marriage, household income, and number of children as determinants of fertility in Singapore. 
They showed that the relationship between fertility and household income is U-shaped. 
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convenience stores, and male and female co-residence rates. In addition, we analyzed 
panel data for 3 terms (2000, 2005, and 2010) and 47 prefectures using fixed effects 
2SLS6. Doing so helped us to find an interdependent relationship between marriage 
behavior and the socioeconomic factors. As already mentioned, the number of 
convenience stores implies the ease of single life and the co-residence rate implies the 
relationship between unmarried adult children and their parents.  
    The model is comprised of the following simultaneous equations (see Table 2.1 
regarding the definition of variables).  
 
(1) Married𝑖𝑡= 𝐵0 + 𝐵1Conit+ 𝐵2FLaborit+ 𝐵3 Co −  R𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4Labor𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵5Edu𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6Wage𝑖𝑡   
                  (－)     (－)         (－)           (＋)         (－)      (＋)      
+ 𝐵7FWage𝑖𝑡 
            (－) 
(2) FMarried𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1Con𝑖𝑡+ 𝐵2FLabor𝑖𝑡+ 𝐵3 FCo −  R𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4Labor𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵5FEdu𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6Wage𝑖𝑡 
(－)     (－)        (－)            (＋)         (－)         (＋)      
 + 𝐵7FWage𝑖𝑡  
               (－) 
(3) Conit = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1Married𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵2FLabor𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵3Labor𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4Road𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5Residense𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6LRS𝑖𝑡 
              (－)           (－)           (+)        (－)        (－)              (－) 
(4) Fertilityit = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1FMarried𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵2FLaborit + 𝐵3FCo −  R𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4Labor𝑖𝑡  +𝐵5FEdu𝑖𝑡  
(＋)          (－)          (－)             (＋)         (－)                 
+ 𝐵6 Nursery𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵7 Three − generation𝑖𝑡   
           (＋)            (＋)  
(5) FLaborit = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1Conit + 𝐵2Fertilityit + 𝐵3Housingit + 𝐵4 FPWit + 𝐵5 PIit                                
              (＋)       (－)          (＋)           (－)       (＋)    
               + 𝐵6 Three − generationit 
                 (＋) 
(6) Co −  R𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1Conit + 𝐵2Labor𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3Edu𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4PIit + 𝐵5Assets𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6Assets2𝑖𝑡  
            (－)      (－)        (＋)        (－)     (－)       (＋) 
 
(7) FCo −  R𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1Conit + 𝐵2FLabor𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3FEdu𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4PIit + 𝐵5Assets𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6Assets2𝑖𝑡 
 (－)       (－)           (＋)        (－)    (－)         (＋) 
In addition, Table 2.2(a) and Table 2.2(b) show the descriptive statistics and the top five 
                                                     
6 The sample size is 141 (47 prefectures and 3 terms (2000, 2005, and 2010)). 
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(and bottom five) prefectures in each main variable. We showed Table 2.2(b) to confirm 
whether there is enough variety in the main variables. 
    Next, we explain the equations. 
Current male and female married rates 
    First, the reason why we used the number of convenience stores in the current 
married rate equations is that the accessibility of convenience stores would affect the 
utility of unmarried persons. As the convenience stores make everyday life more useful, 
singlehood would decrease the opportunity cost of household work or cooking. 
According to the theory of household production, as the opportunity cost of household 
production activity decreases, the merit of marriage decreases. Male and female 
employment rates are also important variables from the perspective of the living 
standard and the trade-off between female employment and marriage. In addition, we 
classify the influence of wages into two effects: income effect and substitution effect. 
Despite the difference between the income effect and substitution effect, these variables 
are also important. Finally, education and co-residence rate are also important. 
Number of convenience stores 
    First, in the case of married men, the demand for convenience stores will decrease 
because of wives’ help regarding household work or cooking. Next, the higher regular 
employment rate promotes overtime work of men, and it would increase the demand for 
convenience stores at a dinner. Even in the case of married men, they might work away 
from their family and tend to use the convenience store. Therefore, male regular 
employment rate will influence the number of convenience stores regardless of marital 
status. However, female regular employment may have little influence on the 
convenience stores because of female superiority to men in household work. Therefore, 
we used female regular employment rate as a variable that decreases the use of 
convenience stores. According to the assumption of Cho (2007), females who work on 
weekdays would hoard up cheaper living necessities at large retail stores on holidays. 
Then, our study assumes that the increase in female regular employment promotes the 
shift of female customers from convenience stores to economical large retail stores. 
    Next, we explain large retail stores, the area of residence, and the length of road. 
Matsui and Nariu (2003) used these variables as factors that decrease the density of 
retail stores. In addition, Matsui and Yukimoto (2004) showed that the increase of car 
ownership and expansion in size of residences are main reason of decline in the number 
of retail stores. These studies explain that the length of road or car ownership influence 
large retail stores in the suburbs, and these factors have negative effects on the number 
15 
 
of rival retail stores. Matsui and Nariu also stated that the area of residence influences 
the stock of household goods and the possession of cars; therefore, people could 
purchase many living necessities at suburban large retail stores. Finally, whereas Matsui 
and Nariu (2003) use the number of retail stores as dependent variables, our study uses 
the number of convenience stores to check whether the same result is obtained or not.   
Fertility rate 
    First, the current female married rate is an essential factor to determine the fertility 
rate. Next, male regular employment rate will have a positive effect on the fertility rate 
because of the stability in living standard. It is also obvious that female work status has 
a negative effect on pregnancy and fertility. According to Becker’s Quality-Quantity 
Model, well-educated women focus on the quality rather than the quantity of their 
children. Therefore, female education also works negatively for the fertility rate. As for 
the co-residence, Yamada (1999) attributes the existence of unmarried persons for the 
falling fertility rate.  
Female regular employment rate 
    First, owing to the presence of many other commercial facilities in the area 
crowded with convenience stores, the demand for labor would increase. Female work 
status would have a close relationship with the fertility rate because the compatibility of 
fertility, childcare, and female employment is very difficult. Next, we used prefecture 
income and owned house rate of the elderly household in this model. The former 
indicates the short-term economic condition and the latter indicates the long-term one. 
In addition, the owned house rate of the elderly household would increase 
three-generation household. Here, three-generation household is a variable that implies 
parents’ support for childcare or household work. Therefore, the increase of 
three-generation household or owned house rate would promote female labor supply. 
Finally, because of lack of data regarding prefectural wages of female regular 
employees, our study uses female part-timer wages as substitutes. 
Male and female co-residence rates  
    First, the accessibility of convenience stores could influence the ease of single life 
of unmarried individuals. As for the variable of education, the unmarried adult children 
would depend on their parents during their education. Recently, the decreasing 
employment rate of new graduates would also increase the co-residence rate. Moreover, 
we use net assets of the elderly household and its square as variables of parent’s 
economic condition. This will be discussed in further detail later.  
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2.3.2  Explanation of the variables used in the simultaneous equation 
model 
    Next, we explain the variables used in this model in detail. First, in line with 
Kitamura and Miyazaki (2011), this study emphasizes the marital status in the 20–39 
age groups from the perspective of fertility. Therefore, we unified all variables into the 
20–39 age groups. On the other hand, we chose over 60-year-old groups to collect 
information regarding the parents who live together with their unmarried adult children. 
These include households with one parent. In the case of the household with two parents, 
we chose households in which the male parent is over 60 years old. Lastly, we explain 
the variable of parent’s economic status. This variable is shown by the below equation. 
  
 
    If we take the economic condition of households, the consumption economies of 
scale of households would be important factor. However, due to lack of data for 
economic scale, we used the consumption expenditure as not a flow variable but as an 
alternative variable of the economic scale of each household. In addition, this variable 
could be interpreted as an indicator that shows how many months the present savings 
can cover consumption. If the value of this equation is higher, children can expect 
inheritance after parents’ death. On the contrary, its lower value will force children to 
support their parents because of parent’s economic poverty. Moreover, figure 1 shows 
the relationship between the co-residence rate and the economic condition of parents. 
As explained in Section 1, the latter variables are divided into linear and quadratic terms. 
Here, if the term of first degree has a negative coefficient and the quadratic term has a 
positive coefficient, we can draw a downward convex as that shown in figure 1. That is, 
on the right side of the quadratic curve, co-residence rate increases because of children’s 
dependence on their parents. On the left side, co-residence rate increases because 
parents depend on children due to their poverty. 
 
2.4.  Empirical results 
     
Next, we interpret the results of the analysis. As explained earlier, our model was 
estimated using the fixed effects 2SLS method (3 terms and 47 prefectures, sample size 
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is 141). The results are shown in Table 2.3. Our study aims to compare the extent of 
correlation among variables in each equation. Therefore, a logarithmic transformation is 
carried out for each variable, so we can interpret the regression coefficients as elasticity 
coefficients. In addition, we conducted robustness checks by dropping some variables 
such as co-residence rate and included the result of fixed-effect (without 2SLS) in 
Appendix A and B.  
(1) Current male married rate 
    Here, we have explained the result of Table 2.3 (for the results of robustness 
checks, see Appendix A and B). First, the number of convenience stores had a negative, 
significant effect on the current married rates. It is believed that the merit of marriage 
decreased because the convenience stores made it easy for single males to perform 
household work. In addition, the establishment of ATMs (Automated Teller Machines) 
at the convenience stores might influence the marital status because of simplified 
administration of cash. However, there is a possibility that a larger number of single 
people promote demand in convenience stores. Li and Houston (2001), through their 
food consumption survey in Taiwan in 1999, empirically showed that unmarried people 
are likely to use convenience stores. Therefore, we should carefully discuss the 
correlation between convenience stores and marital status. 
    As for the regular employment rate, male regular employment rate had a positive, 
significant effect on the current married rate, and female regular employment rate had a 
negative, significant effect. Observing the coefficient elasticity, male employment status 
had close correlation with married rate and fertility; therefore, a decreasing economic 
status of males may be the primary determinant of lower married rate and fertility. 
Although this result indicates that male employment promotes male married rate, it 
could also mean that the married rate influences male employment because married men 
must feed their families. Therefore, the implication of this result should be carefully 
discussed, including the inverse causality. On the other hand, the higher female work 
status would discourage women to get married because marriage may negatively affect 
promotion at work. 
    Next, male co-residence rate also had a negative and significant effect. The 
interpretation of this result must be divided into two cases. First, the unmarried children 
depend on their parents, and second, the poverty-ridden parents depend on their children. 
In the former case, children would not prefer marriage because their parents could take 
over household work or living expenses. In the latter, however, children might give up 
the opportunity of getting married because they are forced to support their parents. This 
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result is also consistent with Sakamoto and Kitamura (2007), and the co-residence 
relationship could be an important factor for marital behavior along with the economic 
condition of males. 
    As for male education, the analysis found that the increasing academic levels cause 
a decreasing current married rate. In explaining this result, we can refer to Ota (2012), 
which found that increasing education levels caused job scarcity for the graduates. This 
study explained that most people came to enter the university in Japan, so incompetent 
graduates have failed to find employment. That is, high school education no longer 
would guarantee the stability of living standard, and the dropouts from graduate 
recruitment would miss the opportunity of getting married. Lastly, male wage had a 
positive and significant effect, while the effect of female wage was negative and 
insignificant.  
(2) Current female married rate 
    The number of convenience stores had a positive, but insignificant effect on the 
current female married rate. According to Li and Houston (2001), women are not likely 
to use convenience stores. Therefore, it is possible that women do not need convenience 
stores due to their superiority in performing household tasks. Likewise, female 
co-residence rate also had a negative, insignificant effect. Women tend to live together 
with their parents before marriage in Japan, so this factor might also influence the result. 
Next, male regular employment rate had a positive and significant effect on the current 
female married rate, while female regular employment is negative and significant. 
Female education also negatively influenced the current female married rate. These are 
same results of current male married rate. Lastly, male and female wages did not have 
significant results. However, the data regarding male and female wages are not divided 
into the cases of regular employees and part-timers. For female wage particularly, 
therefore, it is possible that the existence of the married part-timer caused this 
insignificant results. 
(3) Number of convenience stores 
    The analysis indicates that the increase in current male married rate has negative 
correlation with the number of convenience stores. This implies that married men who 
have their meals at home will be less likely to visit convenience stores. This result is 
consistent with Li and Houston (2001). Although our analysis could not confirm the 
causality between marital rate and the number of convenience stores, we showed a 
negative and significant correlation. Therefore, it is possible that the number of 
convenience stores is an important factor in marital behavior. Moreover, male regular 
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employment rate had a positive, significant effect on the convenience stores. First, if 
male regular employment rate increases, the demand for convenience stores for lunch or 
dinner will increase. Even in the case of married men, male regular employees, who are 
likely to work away from their family, will influence the demand for convenience stores 
positively. 
    On the other hand, female regular employment rate had a negative, significant 
effect. As we already explained, one reason is that women are superior to men in 
household work and cooking. Another reason is that women are unlikely to work 
overtime or work away from their family. In addition, it is possible that a female regular 
employee works for a longer duration on weekdays and purchases living necessities on 
holidays. So then, if we assume that the demand for convenience stores is substituted by 
large retail stores, it may be understood that a female employee negatively influences 
demand for convenience stores. This result coincided with the assumption of Cho 
(2007). Next, both the length of road and the area of residence had a negative, 
significant effect. These signs corresponded with the results of the analysis in Matsui 
and Nariu (2003). Lastly, as compared with Matsui and Nariu, we also used the area of 
residence as a proxy variable of the land price. A larger area of residence may indicate 
the lower price of the residential or commercial area. Therefore, large retail stores will 
have superiority over convenience stores regarding the number of stores.    
(4) Fertility rate 
    First, it is obvious that the current married rate positively affects birth rate. 
Moreover, the female regular employment rate and co-residence rate have a negative, 
significant effect on the fertility rate. If female co-residence rate increases, the trend 
toward late marriage will increase. Higher age of first marriage clearly decreases the 
probability of pregnancy and fertility. Next, the male regular employment rate had a 
positive effect. This is a reasonable result from the perspective of the stability of living 
standard. Finally, female education, nursery school capacity, and three-generation 
households did not have any effect on the fertility rate in this analysis. From the above 
results, it was found that the tendency of late marriage and stable living standard had a 
significant effect on the fertility rate. 
(5) Female regular employment rate 
    First, although we assumed that convenience stores would have a positive effect on 
the demand for labor, we did not obtain significant results regarding the same. However, 
three-generation household had a positive, significant effect. This result indicates that 
parents help married females with childcare or housework, so female regular 
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employment increases. It is also natural that the fertility rate worked negatively on 
female employment situation. Moreover, we have substituted part-timer wages for 
regular employee wages, which had a negative significant effect on female regular 
employment rate. This implies that it is possible that the rise in the number of female 
part-timers would have a negative effect on female regular employment. Prefecture 
income and owned house rate of the elderly household also had a positive, significant 
effect. Prefecture income and owned house rate indicate the economic condition of 
parents, so they have a positive effect on the demand for labor and female regular 
employment in that area.  
    Furthermore, owned house rate of the elderly household would increase the 
number of three-generation households. Therefore, it would decrease the cost of 
childcare and household work and encourage female labor supply. It is also believed 
that higher owned house rate has a negative effect on assets, owing to the possibility of 
housing loans. This in turn would require women to work, in order to meet the 
household finances. That is, the increase in three-generation households and owned 
house rate of the elderly household would have a positive effect on both demand and 
supply of labor. Lastly, as for prefecture income and owned house rate, the former 
indicates the short-term economic condition and the latter indicates the long-term one. 
Moreover, regarding the elasticity coefficient of these variables, prefecture income 
showed 0.69 and owned house rate showed 4.69. It seems that because regular 
employment is decided from the long-term point of view, owned house ratio had larger 
elasticity coefficient. 
(6) Male co-residence rate 
    First, the number of the convenience stores had a positive, insignificant effect. 
However, male regular employment rate and prefecture income had a negative and 
significant effect, which indicates that the stable living standard of younger men 
decreases their dependence on parents. These results hold good for Easterlin’s relative 
income hypothesis. On the contrary, male education had a positive, significant effect. 
The longer time men spend as students, the more likely they would depend on their 
parents. Next, considering the economic condition of parents, the first-degree term had 
positive correlation while the quadratic term had negative correlation. That is, as the 
economic condition of parents increases, co-residence rate also increases because of 
children’s dependence on their parents. Nevertheless, this result also indicates that 
cohabitation rates would increase because parents depend on children due to their 
poverty.  
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(7) Female co-residence rate 
    The number of convenience stores had a negative, insignificant effect. Next, 
female regular employment rate had a negative, insignificant effect. It was found that 
female employment rate does not affect co-residence rate. As for female education and 
prefecture income, the former had a positive, significant effect and the latter had a 
negative, significant effect. These results are coherent with those of the male 
co-residence rate. Lastly, the economic condition of parents also had same results as 
those for the male co-residence rate. However, t-values of these variables are not as 
large as those for male co-residence rate. As already mentioned, these differences 
between male and female co-residence rates may indicate that unmarried women are 
still likely to co-reside with their parents in Japan. 
    Finally, we estimated the value of economic condition of parents on the bottom of 
the quadratic curve from simultaneous equations. The result is shown in Table 2.4. In 
Table 2.4, parents’ economic condition had almost the same value for both male and 
female. As already explained, parents’ economic condition is defined by the ratio of net 
assets to consumption expenditure of the elderly household. This ratio can be 
interpreted as the indicator that shows how many months the present savings can cover 
consumption. If the ratio is just 60, the present’s savings can cover consumption for 
almost 5 years. That is, if the value is higher, children will expect support from their 
parents. However, if the value is close to zero, children will be forced to support their 
parents, so they would have difficulty in marriage. 
 
2.5.  Conclusion 
 
    In the conclusion of our study, we reconfirm the main points of our analysis and 
suggest policy proposals based on the empirical results. First, the result that male 
regular employment rate had the largest, positive elasticity coefficient for both male and 
female marital status indicates that male employment condition is the main determinant 
of marital status. On the other hand, our analysis could not exclude the existence of 
inverse causality. However, our analysis showed close correlation between regular 
employment of males and the marital rate, and Kitamura and Miyazaki (2011) 
empirically claimed the positive influence of economic condition of males on the 
married rate. Therefore, the stability of male employment could be an important 
problem in marital policy. 
    Second, the owned house rate of the elderly household has a positive effect on 
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three-generation household. This in turn would promote married women’s labor supply 
because of the help of their parents regarding household work or childcare. However, in 
the case of the owned house, even the elderly household might have housing loans. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that women enter the labor force to compensate for the 
living expenses. This implies that the increase in female regular employment would not 
necessarily lead to an efficient use of female labor force. We should not only develop 
childcare or employment support for career-oriented women, but also establish a system 
or policy that provides an environment in which women can concentrate on both 
household work and childcare.         
    Finally, the main finding of our analysis is that pertaining to the co-residence of 
unmarried adult children with their parents. This co-residence is correlated with the 
economic condition of parents (poverty and affluence). That is, these unmarried adult 
children can be divided into two groups: those who enjoy richer life at parental home 
and those who are obliged to support their poor parents by staying at parental home. In 
the former case, we need to consider independence or employment support for the youth 
generation. According to the empirical results, education also causes the increase of 
co-residence, which would stem from the decline in the quality of students and the 
increase of jobless new graduates. Therefore, supports for the dropouts from graduate 
recruitment would also be required.        
    In the latter case, even if unmarried adult children expect a higher living standard 
after leaving parental home, there is probability that they miss the opportunity of 
obtaining a job or marriage for looking after their parents. In these cases, financial 
support or nursing benefits for the elderly household would lead to elimination of the 
economic barriers to entrance into the university, obtaining employment, and marriage 
of the youth generation. We also need to discuss the policy that encourages unmarried 
children to live together with parents after marriage. The increase in three-generation 
household not only promotes female labor supply but also leads to efficiency of the 
elderly persons through childcare or housework. Therefore, financial benefits for the 
elderly household would be important from the perspective of both self-reliance of the 
youth-generation and the efficiency of the elderly generation.  
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Data Resources 
 
The number of currently married persons, prefecture population, the number of 
unmarried children, the number of regular employees, the number of students and 
graduates from universities, and the number of married persons living with parents: 
“National Census” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication). 
 
Total area per residence, owned house rate of the elderly household: “Building Stock 
Statistics” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication).  
 
TFR (Total Fertility Rate): “Jinko Toukei Shiryoshu” [“Demographic Statistics”] 
(National Institute of Population and Security Research). 
 
Monthly wages per employee and wages of female part-timers: “Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure” (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare). 
 
Capacity of nursery schools: “Survey on Social Welfare Facilities” (Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare). 
 
The number of convenience stores and large retail stores: “Census of Commerce” 
(Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry). 
 
Sales of food and beverages: “Current Survey of Commerce” (Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry). 
 
Total production in prefecture: “Report on Prefectural Accounts” (Cabinet Office). 
 
Total length of road: “Annual Report of Road Statistics” (Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism). 
 
The number of cars owned: “Statistical Data About the Number of Vehicles Owned” 
(Automobile Inspection and Registration Information Association). 
http://www.airia.or.jp/ 
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Table 2.1    Definition of endogenous and exogenous variables 
Endogenous variables    
Variable name                 Variable definition 
Married         Currently married males aged 20–39/Male population aged 20–39 
FMarried        Currently married females aged 20–39/Female population aged 20–39 
Con            The number of convenience stores/The area of prefecture      
Fertility         Total fertility rate 
FLabor          Female regular employees aged 20–39/Female population aged 20–39 
Co-R           Unmarried males aged 20–39 who live together with parents/Male population aged 
20– 39 
FCo-R          Unmarried females aged 20–39 who live together parents/Female population aged 20–
39 
Exogenous variables 
 Variable name                 Variable definition 
Labor           Male regular employees aged 20–39/Male population aged 20–39     
Edu             Male students and graduates from the university aged 20–39/Male population aged 
20-39  
Fedu            Female students and graduates from the university aged 20–39/Female population 
aged 20–39 
Wage            Monthly wages per male employee (thousand yen) 
Fwage           Monthly wages per female employee (thousand yen) 
Road            Total length of road /The number of cars (km) 
Residence        Total area per residence (𝑚2) 
LRS             Number of large retail stores/Sales of food and beverages  
Nursery          Capacity of nursery school/Female population aged 20–39 
Fpw             Wages of female part-timers per hour (yen) 
Three-generation   Married persons who live with parents /Population aged 20–39 
PI                Total production in prefecture /Total population (yens/thousand) 
Housing       Owned house rate of the elderly household (head of the household is over 60 years old) 
Assets           Net assets of the elderly household/Consumption expenditure of the elderly 
household per month  
Assets2           Square of Assets 
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Table 2.2(a)    Descriptive statistics  
Note: The value of each variable is the average from 2000 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Standard deviation Max Min 
Married 0.41 0.03 0.46 0.31 
FMarried 0.50 0.04 0.58 0.39 
Con 0.23 0.43 2.59 0.02 
Fertility 1.43 0.14 1.87 1.00 
Flabor 0.47 0.11 0.69 0.26 
Co-R 0.24 0.09 0.41 0.08 
FCo-R 0.23 0.11 0.43 0.02 
Labor 0.68 0.08 0.82 0.41 
Edu 0.31 0.06 0.45 0.20 
FEdu 0.19 0.05 0.33 0.10 
Wage 336 33.77 442 259 
FWage 222 20.74 298 183 
Road 25.97 12.87 102.51 6.05 
Residence 105.89 19.03 154.75 63.00 
LRS 65.63 20.48 121.51 25.03 
Nursery 0.40 0.08 0.56 0.19 
Three-generation 0.21 0.11 0.52 0.05 
FPW 885 77.81 1156 723 
Housing 0.85 0.06 0.94 0.63 
PI 2727 414 4628 2018 
Assets 
 
68.02 12.37 95.38 30.14 
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Table 2.2(b) Summary for top 5 and bottom 5 region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top5 Married  FMarried  Fertility  Con  Flabor 
Miyazaki 44.27% Fukui 55.02% Okinawa 1.80 Tokyo 2.519 Yamagata 56.24% 
Kagawa 43.84% Yamagata 54.29% Shimane 1.61 Osaka 1.380 Toyama 55.57% 
Wakayama 43.62% Mie 54.01% Miyazaki 1.59 Kanagawa 1.251 Fukui 55.28% 
Mie 43.36% Toyama 53.88% Saga 1.59 Saitama 0.593 Shimane 54.79% 
Fukui 43.31% Fukushima 53.62% Fukui 1.57 Aichi 0.501 Nigata 53.53% 
 
Bottom 5 
      
 
   
Saitama 37.51% Nara 46.72% Kanagawa 1.26 Akita 0.031 Kyoto 41.53% 
Chiba 37.51% Osaka 45.86% Nara 1.26 Hokkaido 0.030 Hyogo 41.47% 
Kanagawa 36.36% Fukuoka 44.18% Hokkaido 1.25 Iwate 0.029 Nara 40.49% 
Kyoto 35.59% Kyoto 43.41% Kyoto 1.21 Kochi 0.028 Osaka 40.02% 
Tokyo 30.67% Tokyo 40.25% Tokyo 1.06 Shimane 0.024 Okinawa 39.29% 
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Table 2.3    Empirical results by Fixed effects 2SLS (Full model) 
Notes: 1. Coefficient values are shown on the left side, and t-values are shown in parentheses. 
      2. For the definitions of the variables, see Table 2.1.  
      3. * ,**, and*** indicate significance at 10% , 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
4. In the bottom line of the table, chi-square values are presented, and their p-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Married FMarried Con Fertility Flabor Co-R FCo-R
Married -3.52***(-3.13)
FMarried 1.99***(2.56)
Con -0.03**(-2.29) -0.04(-0.98) 0.58 (1.63) 0.27 (0.49) -1.34  (-1.07)
Fertility -0.40*(-1.87)
Flabor -0.18***(-4.24) -0.11***(-3.59) -0.94***(-3.85) -0.55***(-5.24) 0.37 (0.71)
Co-R -0.06***(-3.83)
FCo-R -0.01 (-1.48) -0.05**(-2.15)
Labor  0.29*** (4.75) 0.24***(5.47) 1.68***(3.58) 0.42**(1.98) -2.45***(-8.66)
Edu -0.14***(-3.32) 2.92***(4.29)
FEdu -0.19***(-4.13) 0.16 (0.77) 4.52***(5.68)
Wage  0.17* (1.91) 0.10 (1.11)
FWage -0.11 (-1.34) 0.05 (0.80)
Road -0.11**(-2.03)
Residence -2.32***(-5.03)
LRS -0.05 (-0.51)
Nursery 0.009 (0.09)
Three-generation 0.05 (0.72) 1.31***(9.63)
FPW -0.51*(-1.71)
PI 0.70**(2.41) -1.16**(-1.99) -2.26*(-1.70)
Assets -13.43***(-2.88) -16.70*(-1.69)
Assets 2 1.61***(2.88) 2.01*(1.70)
Housing 4.95***(4.54)
Constant term -1.65*** (-2.92) -2.01***(-3.44) 5.86**(2.32) 1.75*(1.93) 1.58 (0.54) 38.79***(4.01) 55.82***(2.86)
Hausman test  Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect
Chi^2(p) 7.87 (0.34) 29.49 (0.00) 9.25 (0.16) 41.11 (0.00) 163.92 (0.00) 64.68 (0.00) 35.60(0.00)
R-sq
with in 0.74 0.94 0.19 0.69 0.92 0.87 0.79
between 0.56 0.39 0.60 0.15 0.33 0.0009 0.10
overall 0.58 0.50 0.59 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.09
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Table 2.4   Parents’ economic condition on the bottom of the quadratic curve 
 
 
Parents’ economic condition  
Male co-residence     66.02 
Female co-residence   65.03 
 
 
Notes: 1. This table shows the number of months for which parents’ savings can cover consumption 
expenditure. 
     2. These values are calculated using the below equation. 
Assets of the elderly household－Debt of the elderly household
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
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     Co-residence is promoted because of    Co-residence is promoted because of 
parents’ poverty.                   children’s dependence on parents. 
                                                   
                                                   Parents’economic condition 
 
Figure 2.1 Relationship between co-residence rate and parents’ economic condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Chapter 3 
The effect of health status on life cycle asset 
accumulation in Japan 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the era of high economic growth in Japan from the 1960s to the 1970s, 
the household saving rate was between 10% and 20%, and the amount of assets had 
been increasing. However, Japan faced a rapid decrease in saving rate since the 1990s, 
and the amount of household assets decreased. Horioka (2010a) explains that population 
ageing led to the decline in the household saving rate in Japan. On the other hand, the 
elderly household saving rate also decreased since the 2000s in Japan. According to 
Horioka (2010b), the decrease in the elderly household saving rate is due to the 
reduction of social security benefits or the increase of consumption expenditures, 
including medical expenses. In ageing societies such as Japan, identifying the saving 
behavior of the elderly household plays an important role in understanding the trend in 
the total saving rate.  
The survival rate of elderly people is also important for saving behavior. Yaari 
(1965) introduces the survival rate into the life cycle model of Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954). Yaari shows theoretically that the higher survival rate increases asset 
accumulation in preparation for consumption or medical expenses during the senior 
period. As for empirical studies that include lifetime uncertainty, Bloom, Canning, and 
Graham (2003) and Kageyama (2003) show empirically that longevity increases asset 
accumulation. Next, there are some empirical studies about the relationship between the 
aggregate saving rate and ageing population. The ageing population could have both 
positive and negative effects on the aggregate saving rate. Here, the positive effect 
indicates that young people save more money preparing for consumption during 
retirement (behavioral effect), and the negative effect indicates that an increase in 
retirees in the population (compositional effect) will reduce the aggregate saving rate. 
That is, the change of saving rate depends on which effect is larger, and these effects are 
sensitive to the data or sample selection (Kinugasa and Mason, 2007; Wong and Tang, 
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2013). 
The uncertainty of social welfare benefits or future income will also be important 
for the decisions pertaining to saving behavior. According to the life cycle model, the 
increase in future pension (or income) reduces the uncertainty of the senior period; 
therefore, the necessity of saving money will decrease. There are some empirical studies 
about the relation between future income and asset accumulation (Alessie, Angelini, and 
Santen, 2013; van-Schie, Donkers, and Dellaert, 2012). These results show that people 
save more money when there is inadequacy of pension or future income. On the other 
hand, Horioka (2010b) explains that the reduction of the Japanese public pension 
rapidly increased the elderly dissaving rate. 
On the other hand, the bequest motive is also an important factor in the life cycle 
model. Skinner (1985) conducts the main research that used the bequest motive in the 
life cycle model. According to the Skinner, longevity does not only have a positive 
effect but also a negative effect on asset accumulation under the assumption of the 
bequest motive. That is, the positive effect means that longevity promotes asset 
accumulation during youth, with preparation for consumption during old age. On the 
other hand, the negative effect indicates that longevity may decrease the incentive to 
build up assets for leaving bequests. Whether the negative effect is larger than the 
positive effect depends on the relative size of the bequest of youth and old age. 
Moreover, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002) construct a life cycle model adding 
medical uncertainty into the above model. 
The study of Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2010) concerns retirement and mortality 
risk. According to this study, the decrease in mortality risk has two effects: the “horizon 
effect” and “uncertainty effect.” If mortality decreases, the probability of living up to 
the older age and expected consumption will increase. Therefore, a lower mortality risk 
has a positive effect on lifetime working hours. This is the horizon effect. However, 
under a higher mortality risk, people continue to work in their old age, and in this case 
lower mortality risk reduces the planned age of retirement. This is the “uncertainty 
effect.” This study shows that the “uncertainty effect” can dominate the “horizontal 
effect” from the life table in the last century. Moreover, Liang, Bennett, Sugisawa, 
Kobayashi, and Fukaya (2003) present a study about gender differences in mortality. 
As stated above, many studies have been approaching the introduction of longevity 
or the bequest motive into the life cycle model, and these factors play an important role 
in understanding the saving behavior in recent ageing societies. This Chapter will 
identify the effect of longevity and the bequest motive on the assets of the elderly 
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person. As already explained, longevity could promote the behavioral effect and 
compositional effect on aggregate savings. The aim of this Chapter is to identify the 
saving behavior of the elderly person; the compositional effect should therefore be 
removed. Therefore, to remove the compositional effect, this Chapter will analyze the 
health situation of each elderly person by means of micro data. In the analysis, this 
Chapter will use the interaction dummy between the health status and each variable, and 
the effect of the health situation on assets will be analyzed. 
This Chapter is organized as follows. In section 2-2, a life cycle model will be 
developed that includes the survival rate of an elderly person based on the model of 
Yaari (1965) and Kinugas and Mason (2007). In section 2-3, the effect of the health 
situation and bequest motive on assets of an elderly person will be analyzed by using 
the interaction dummy. In addition, this Chapter will remove the non-retired sample, in 
order to control for sample selection bias between the retired and non-retired samples. 
Last, section 2-4 concludes and outlines the policy implications of this Chapter.       
 
3.2 Theoretical Model 
 
The following life cycle model, including survival rate, will be explained. In this 
model, it is assumed that all individuals are elderly people, who face a mortality risk at 
the start of the senior period and necessarily die at the end of the second period. The 
following equation represents the utility function and budget constraints of individuals. 
U=ln𝐶1
∗+ 
𝑞2
(1+𝜌 )
ln𝐶2
∗                                          (3.1) 
 𝐴1=(1+r)𝐴0+𝑌1 − 𝐶1                                               (3.2) 
0 = (1+r)𝐴1+𝑌2 − 𝐶2                                                (3.3) 
where 𝐶1
∗ and 𝐶2
∗ represent consumption in the first and second period of senior hood, 
respectively; 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 represent the pension of the first and second  𝑌1  and 𝑌2 
represent the pension of the first and second periods of seniorhood; 𝜌 is the subjective 
discount rate; r is the interest rate; and 𝑞2 is the survival rate at the end of the first 
period. Here, the logarithm of the utility function is taken and the bequest motive is 
excluded, for simplification of the problem. 
Solving the utility function and budget constraints, optimal assets of the first 
period are obtained (see Appendix C and D). 
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𝐴1 = 
𝑞2 (1+𝑟)
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝐴0+ 
𝑞2 
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝑌1 − 
1+𝜌
(1+𝑟)(1+𝜌 +𝑞2)
𝑌2                            (3.4) 
The coefficients of 𝐴0 and 𝑌1, which are positive, indicate that the assets of the youth 
period and pension benefits of the first period of seniorhood have a positive effect on 
the assets of the elderly person. On the other hand, the negative coefficient of 𝑌2 means 
that an increase in 𝑌2 weakens the necessity to save money in preparation for the 
future; therefore, 𝐴1 will decrease. In addition, this Chapter identifies the effect of the 
survival rate, 𝑞2, on 𝐴1 as follows. 
Proposition 1 If  𝑞2 increases, the coefficient of  𝐴0, 𝑌1, and 𝑌2 on  𝐴1 increases; 
therefore,  𝐴1 also increases. 
Proof  
 
𝑑𝐴1
𝑑𝑞2
 = 
(1+𝑟)(1+𝜌)
(1+𝜌 +𝑞2)
2 𝐴0 +  
(1+𝜌)
(1+𝜌 +𝑞2)
2 𝑌1 +  
1
(1+𝑟)(1+𝜌 +𝑞2)
2 𝑌2 > 0                (3.5) 
Equation (3.5) shows that a higher survival rate increases asset accumulation in 
preparation for a future life. It is clear that the increase of 𝑞2 also has a positive effect 
on the coefficient of each variable from (3.5). That is, the effect of each variable that 
promotes asset accumulation will become stronger, and the effect of the variable that 
restrains asset accumulation will weaken. In analysis, the interaction term of the health 
dummy and each variable is used to show the effect of survival rate on asset 
accumulation. 
Although the bequest motive is excluded for simplification in the above model, the 
bequest motive is also an important factor for asset accumulation in ageing societies. 
Therefore, another life cycle model is explained, that includes the bequest motive based 
on the model of Skinner (1985). The utility function and budget constraints are as 
follows. 
U=ln𝐶1
∗ + 
𝑞2
(1 + ρ) 
ln𝐶2
∗ + (1−𝑞2) k ln𝐴1
∗  + 
𝑞2
(1 + ρ) 
k ln𝐴2
∗                    (3.6) 
A1= (1+r ) A0 +Y1 − C1                                             (3.7) 
A2= (1+r ) A1 +Y2 − C2                                             (3.8) 
In this model, individuals get utility by leaving a bequest (𝐴1
∗  or 𝐴2
∗ ) for their children, 
and k is the weight parameter of bequest. The other parameters are equal to those of 
previous model. Solving the utility function and budget constraints, the optimal assets 
of first period are as follows (See Appendix C and D). 
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1
A1
 = 
1
(1- 𝑞2)k
 
1
(1+r) A0+Y1-A1
− 
𝑞2(1+𝑟)
(1- 𝑞2)(1+ρ )
 
1+𝑘
𝑘
 
1
(1+r) A1+Y2
       (3.9) 
In addition, the relation between 𝑘 and A1 is shown as follows. 
Proposition 2 The weight parameter of bequest 𝑘 positively affects assets of the first 
period, A1 if 𝑞2 < 
 (1+ρ)
(1+r  )
C2+A2
C1
 
Proof: See Appendix C and D.  
This indicates that the bequest motive may promote asset accumulation, but its effect 
depends on the survival rate of individuals. That is, unhealthy elderly people tend to 
save money for leaving bequests, but the bequest motive is not the main factor for asset 
accumulation of healthy elderly people. It is also empirically confirmed whether there is 
a difference in the effect of the bequest motive on asset accumulation between healthy 
and unhealthy people. 
 
3.3 Empirical model and results  
 
In this section, an empirical analysis about the assets of the elderly person is based 
on the previous life cycle model. First, the following regression equation and the robust 
standard error with ordered probit model are estimated. 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +𝛽2Bequest + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽4Educ + 𝛽5Poverty + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠  
        (+)         (+)         (+)        (+)       (-)      (+)               
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 
  (-) 
In the analysis, the non-retired sample is removed and a distinction is made between the 
sample that has serious diseases and the sample that does not have serious diseases. 
Here, it is also discussed whether or not there is a difference between the saving 
behaviors of these two samples.  
As for the variables of the model, Table 3.1 explains the definition of the 
dependent and independent variables, and Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics. The 
dependent variable is the assets of an elderly person and his or her spouse, and assets 
are divided into four classes (1 = less than 1 million yen; 2 = between 1 and 5 million 
yen; 3 = between 5 and 20 million yen; 4 = 20 million yen or more). The data of all 
variables are provided by the 2006 Japanese AHEAD (Aging and Health Dynamics) 
survey. The original data of assets are discrete values; an ordered probit model was 
therefore used in the analysis. 
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Next, the definition of variables and interpretations are explained. First, the effect 
of public pension on the amount of elderly assets is explained. Here, public pension 
means Y1 or Y2 of the previous life cycle model. As for the relation between future 
income and asset accumulation, some empirical studies show that a higher future 
pension or income decreases the saving rate (Alessie, Angelini, and Santen, 2012; 
van-Schie, Donkers, and Dellaert, 2012). As already explained, future pension or 
income, Y2 decreases asset accumulation, which is consistent with these studies. On 
the other hand, the present public pension, Y1 will have a positive effect on asset 
accumulation. That is, if the present pension benefits increase, elderly people can cover 
living or medical expenses, and they will not tend to dissave assets. 
Second, 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 is the years of schooling, House is the dummy for owned house, and 
Poverty is the dummy for the poverty experience. These variables mainly refer to the 
assets of the youth period, A0, and the years of schooling refer to the ability or parental 
assets during the youth period. The dummy of owned house is used as a variable about 
employment or living standard, because data about job or income during the youth 
period were not available. On the other hand, there is a possibility that the poverty 
experience decreases the assets during the senior period, because of the difficulty in 
employment or entering schools during the youth period. 
Next, Bmotive refers to the extent of the bequest motive for their children (1 = do 
not have the bequest motive at all; 2 = do not have bequest motive; 3 = have bequest 
motive; 4 = have strong bequest motive). If elderly people have a bequest motive, they 
tend to increase their assets in the same way as assumed by the previous life cycle 
model. In addition, Mcons refers to the consciousness of preparing for medical or 
nursing expenses by oneself; if the consciousness is strong, the elderly person tends to 
increase assets. Nchild represents the number of children. If there are many children, 
parents can expect a stable life during seniorhood through economical or physical 
support from children. Therefore, there is a possibility that people who have many 
children do not save as actively.  
Next, empirical results and interpretations are explained. Table 3.3 shows the 
results of the model, divided into the healthy and unhealthy samples. First, pension and 
the years of schooling had significant positive effects on the assets in both the healthy 
and unhealthy sample. If an elderly person has enough pension benefits to cover living 
expenses, they will not tend to dissave their assets. The years of schooling refer to the 
ability or employment status during the youth period; therefore, it will also increase 
assets during the senior period. The dummy of owned house implies assets or economic 
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status at young period, and had a positive effect on the healthy sample. However, it did 
not have a significant effect on the unhealthy sample. Moreover, the experience of 
poverty and the number of children had a negative (but not significant) effect on both 
the healthy and unhealthy samples.  
Next, people who have a bequest motive will save money in preparation for 
leaving assets for children. According to the results, the extent of the bequest motive 
had a negative (but not significant) effect on the healthy sample; however, it had a 
positive and significant effect on the unhealthy sample. Therefore, there is a possibility 
that the difference exists in saving behavior between the healthy and unhealthy sample. 
Healthy people tend to save money in preparation for future living or medical expenses. 
On the other hand, unhealthy people tend to save money in preparation for leaving a 
bequest. This result is consistent with Proposition 2, which shows that the bequest 
motive positively affects asset accumulation under a sufficiently low survival rate. 
To see the effect of health status on the assets of the elderly, additional analysis 
was conducted by using the interaction term of the health dummy and each variable. 
Table 3.4 shows the model and results of the empirical analysis, and the health dummy 
refers to whether or not the people have serious diseases. First, the bequest motive had a 
positive and significant effect, and the interaction term of a bequest and the health 
dummy had a negative significant effect on the assets of the elderly. The former 
indicates that elderly people who have a bequest motive save more money to this end. 
The latter indicates that healthy people save less money in preparation for a bequest 
compared to unhealthy people. This result is consistent with Proposition 2.  
Second, the interaction dummy of pension and education had a positive significant 
effect on the assets. As for the owned house dummy, it did not have a significant effect; 
however, the interaction dummy had a positive, significant effect. According to the 
previous life cycle model, there is a positive relationship between the survival rate and 
the coefficient of each variable. That is, this result indicates that the health status 
positively affects asset accumulation through the increase in the positive effect of each 
variable. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
The conclusion to this Chapter and its political implications are outlined here. First, 
public pension had a positive effect on the amount of assets of the elderly person. 
Horioka (2010b) explains that the reduction of social security benefits is a reason for the 
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rapid decrease of the elderly saving rate. This result is consistent with the explanation of 
Horioka (2010b). Therefore, public pension funds are important for the stable economic 
condition of elderly people. Second, according to empirical results, the consciousness of 
preparing for future medical or nursery expenses increases the assets of the elderly 
person. From seeing this result, there is a possibility that future uncertainty prevents 
optimal consumption by the elderly person. Therefore, from the perspective of the 
effective use of the elderly’s assets, a policy that removes future uncertainty will also be 
important. 
Last, this Chapter showed that a difference exists in the saving behavior of healthy 
and unhealthy people by the interaction dummy pertaining to health status. This is the 
main finding of this Chapter. This difference particularly pertains to the results of the 
bequest motive. The latter had a positive effect on assets, but the interaction dummy of 
the bequest motive and health dummy had a negative effect. This indicates that the 
unhealthy elderly person saves more money than the healthy person. According to 
Proposition 2, the bequest motive promotes asset accumulation under a sufficiently low 
survival rate. Therefore, the empirical result is consistent with theoretical model. On the 
other hand, the interaction dummy for other variables had a positive effect, and this is 
consistent with the previous life cycle model. This result indicates that healthy people 
tend to save more money compared to unhealthy people. Therefore, based on these 
results, the health status of the elderly person should be taken into consideration in the 
development of policy concerning household assets or saving behavior. However, there 
is a possibility that endogeneity exists between health status and bequest motive. We 
would like to treat the endogeneity as a future issue. 
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Table 3.1 Definition of variables  
Name                           Definition   
Assets      Assets of the elderly person (1 = < 1 million yen; 2 = 1 million yen ~ 5 million 
yen; 3 = 5 million yen ~20 million yen; 4 =< 20 million yen)  
Pension    The allowance of public pension  
Mcons      The consciousness of preparing for medical expense by oneself  
Educ       The years of schooling  
House      The dummy for owned house  
Bmotive    The extent of the bequest motive (4 = have strongly bequest motive; 3 = have 
bequest motive; 2 = do not have bequest motive; 1 = do not have bequest motive 
at all) 
Poverty     The dummy for the experience of poverty  
Nchild.      Number of children 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 3.3 Empirical results of the healthy sample and the unhealthy sample 
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Table 3.4 Empirical results by health dummy 
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Chapter 4 
Determinants of educational attainment in an ageing 
society 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
Recently, both educational attainment and life expectancy have increased globally. 
For educational attainment, the tertiary enrollment ratio has reached 30% in the past 
five years. Life expectancy at birth has also risen above 70 years since the 2000s. Many 
studies have discussed the relationship between life expectancy and educational 
attainment, starting from that of Ben-Porath (1967). Ben-Porath (1967) showed that 
increasing life expectancy raises lifetime working hours and the benefits from education, 
while schooling time then rises owing to the increase in the return to education. 
Kalemli-Ozcan (2000, 2002) also showed a positive correlation between the decline in 
mortality and educational investment. Therefore, longevity is an important factor for 
educational attainment. The quality–quantity trade-off is also important for educational 
attainment. The decline in fertility promotes education by raising educational 
investment per child. Prettner et al. (2012) found a negative correlation between the 
fertility rate and education by using panel data on educational attainment, controlling 
for the fixed effect, fertility rate, lagged per capita GDP, and lagged population. In this 
chapter, we identify the effect of longevity and fertility on education by using 
country-level panel data. We add the adult mortality rate into the model of Prettner et al. 
(2012) and use adult mortality as a variable that represents lifetime working hours. The 
adult mortality rate is more important than life expectancy for identifying the effect of 
lifetime working hours on education.  
In terms of the relationship between education and economic growth, educational 
investment plays an important role, with many studies theoretically and empirically 
showing the positive effect of educational attainment on economic growth (Mankiw et 
al., 1992; Lee and Mason, 2010; Prettner et al., 2012). These studies focus on the 
economic growth driven by higher education by analyzing the decline in fertility in 
developed countries. The negative correlation between education and the fertility rate 
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suggests that the quality–quantity trade-off between education and the fertility rate is 
important for economic development in developed countries7. The remainder of this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces previous studies of the 
relationship between education and life expectancy starting from Ben-Porath (1967). 
Section 4.3 explains the data and empirical model, and the results are presented in 
Section 4.4. Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes and outlines the policy implications of this 
study. 
 
4.2 Previous research 
 
Theoretical and empirical studies have discussed the relationship between life 
expectancy and educational attainment, starting from the study of Ben-Porath (1967) 
(Kalemli-Ozcan, 2000, 2002; Hansen and Lonstrup, 2012; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; 
Leker and Ponthiere, 2015; Sánchez-Romero et al., 2016). The argument of Ben-Porath 
is that increased life expectancy, which leads to increasing lifetime working hours, 
induces individuals to invest more in education. Kalemli-Ozcan (2000) showed that the 
decline in mortality has positively affected educational investment. According to 
Kalemli-Ozcan (2000), such a positive correlation means that investment in education 
leads to higher educational returns under the longer lifetime period. In addition, 
Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) argued that the decline in the mortality rate reduces 
precautionary demand for children and increases educational investment by parents. 
On the contrary, some studies argue that the Ben-Porath mechanism cannot explain 
the positive relationship between lifetime working hours and educational investment. 
Cervellati and Sunde (2013) theoretically and empirically showed that an increase in 
lifetime labor is not a necessary condition for longer life expectancy to increase 
education, using an age-specific survival rate. That is, lifetime working hours may not 
be a factor behind higher educational investment and the survival rate during prime 
working age is important for explaining the Ben-Porath mechanism. Hansen and 
Lonstrup (2012) theoretically showed that life expectancy increases educational 
investment but promotes early retirement, using the three-period lifecycle model, which 
is not consistent with the Ben-Porath mechanism. In addition, Sánchez-Romero et al. 
(2016) theoretically showed that a decline in mortality increases educational attainment 
                                                     
7 Minamimura and Yasui (2016) shows that mortality decline promotes the replacement of physical 
capital accumulation by human capital. 
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and promotes early retirement if the income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
They also showed that a decline in mortality after retirement induces education because 
individuals finance their consumption and expenses after retirement by income earned 
through educational investment during the working period. 
Leker and Ponthiere (2015) developed a three-period OLG model based on human 
capital accumulation, the survival rate, and bargaining power between the parent and 
child. In the model, educational investment is determined by intra-family bargaining 
power between parents and children. They showed that individuals educate themselves 
to benefit from a higher future income, whereas parents are motivated to educate their 
children because they expect greater support from educated children. According to 
Leker and Ponthiere (2015), parental preference for children’s education promotes 
educational investment: if parental preference for children’s education is higher, the 
bargaining power of the parent has a positive effect on educational investment. 
Among empirical studies of education, Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) 
showed that a 70% reduction in female maternal mortality risk increases female life 
expectancy by 1.5 years and increases female literacy by 2.4% in Sri Lanka. They used 
the rapid decrease in maternal mortality between 1946 and 1953 in Sri Lanka to identify 
the effect of a longer horizon on education and exclude other health effects on education. 
In addition, Sun et al. (2012) analyzed the relationship between the mortality rate and 
illiteracy rate by using a difference-in-differences analysis and cross-province data in 
China. The results showed that a decline in mortality lowers the illiteracy rate and 
increases average schooling years. 
Many studies use college availability as an instrumental variable of educational 
attainment. First, some studies use the presence of a college in the country as an 
instrumental variable of college attendance (Card, 1993; Carneiro et al., 2011; Doyle 
and Skinner, 2015). Card (1993) shows that the presence of four-year colleges in the 
area where men grew up leads to higher educational attainment and earnings. Carneiro 
et al. (2011) and Doyle and Skinner (2015) also use the presence of a four-year college 
in the country of residence at 14 years, and these studies show that the college 
availability has a positive effect on education. On the other hand, Currie and Moretti 
(2003) uses the number of colleges as an instrumental variable of schooling. They use 
the number of two- and four-year colleges as the proxy for college openings. 
Based on the foregoing, the present study analyzes educational attainment as a 
factor that promotes economic development. From these previous studies, the 
correlation between education and life expectancy is an important factor for educational 
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attainment that is worth discussing. In addition, educational attainment is a particularly 
important factor for economic development in ageing or low fertility societies. Prettner 
et al. (2012) used panel data on educational attainment, controlling for the fixed effect, 
fertility rate, lagged per capita GDP, and lagged population, finding a quality–quantity 
trade-off between education and fertility. We analyze the average years of education by 
adding the survival rate at 65 years into the model of Prettner et al. (2012). In this 
chapter, we also use the adult mortality rate to identify the positive effect of lifetime 
working hours in addition to the fertility rate.  
 
4.3 Data and empirical model 
 
Here, we explain the empirical model and data. We conduct an empirical analysis 
on the effect of life expectancy on educational attainment based on the model of 
Ben-Porath (1967) or Hansen and Lonstrup (2012). In addition, we use country-level 
panel data taken from the World Development Indicators and education statistics on five 
years (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010). The panel data set is unbalanced. The 
empirical model is a fixed or random effect model, and we decide whether the model is 
a fixed or random effect model by using the Hausman test.  
Next, we explain the empirical model and define the variables. The definition and 
descriptive statistics of each variable are shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Our 
empirical model is shown as follows. Here, plus or minus means the sign of the 
hypothesis: 
Log Educ 25–29 years = 𝛽1 Survival (or log Lifeex) +𝛽2 Fertility + 𝛽3 Educ65-years  
                    (+)                     (-)         (+) 
+𝛽4 logGDP + 𝛽5 Capacity 25–29 years  
 (+)          (+) 
Log Educ 30–34 years = 𝛽1 Survival (or log Lifeex) +𝛽2 Fertility + 𝛽3 Educ 70-years 
                    (+)                     (-)         (+)  
+𝛽4 logGDP + 𝛽5 Capacity 30–34 years  
 (+)          (+) 
    We chose 25–29 years and 30–34 years as age categories for the independent variable. There is 
a possibility that some individuals are enrolled in educational institutions, even in the latter half of 
20s in the developed countries. Therefore, identifying the trend of educational attainment by the 
early 30s is more important, particularly in the developed countries. Educ 25–29 years and Educ 
30–34 years mean the average years of total education at 25–29 years and 30–34 years, 
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respectively. Second, Survival and Lifeex mean the survival rate at 65 years and life 
expectancy at 0 years, respectively. Fertility is the total fertility rate, and Educ 65-years 
and Educ 70-years mean the average years of total education at more than 65 years and 
more than 70 years, respectively. GDP is per capita GDP. In addition, Capacity 25–29 
years (30–34 years) is the ratio of the lagged 15 years (20 years) size of enrollment in 
educational institutions and population at 25–29 years (30–34 years). 
Next, we explain the hypothesis of our empirical model. First, Survival or log 
Lifeex is expected to have a positive effect on education because longevity leads to 
longer lifetime working hours and thus a higher educational return. According to the 
Ben-Porath mechanism, lifetime working hours affect education; hence, we use the 
survival rate at 65 years (i.e., in the retirement period). In addition, the adult mortality 
rate is expected to promote educational investment to finance consumption after 
retirement, in line with the explanation of Sánchez-Romero et al. (2016). In the analysis, 
we analyze average years of schooling at 25–29 years and 30–34 years. We use the 
survival rate at 65 years as a variable to represent whether individuals survive to 
retirement age. However, if the share of primary industry such as agriculture is large, 
individuals are working in industries unaffected by retirement age. Therefore, we also 
analyze OECD countries to check the robustness of the effect of adult mortality on 
education. In addition, we use life expectancy at birth as a robustness check. 
The fertility rate is expected to have a negative effect on educational investment 
because the number of children decreases educational investment per child. Educ 
65-years and Educ 70-years mean parental preference for children’s education. Leker 
and Ponthiere (2015) showed that parents who have a preference for child education 
promote educational investment in their children. Per capita GDP is expected to 
promote educational attainment because of rising income. Capacity 25–29 years and 
Capacity 30–34 years mean the availability of education (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education). We use the ratio of the size of enrollment and population of the 
cohort aged 10–14 years. According to Currie and Moretti (2003), the higher capacity of 
educational institutions promotes educational attainment. 
 
4.4 Empirical results 
 
Next, we explain the empirical results and interpretations. We take the 10-year lag 
of each variable except Educ 65-years and Educ 70-years, and our empirical model is 
based on that of Prettner et al. (2012). The empirical results are shown in Table 4.3 and 
47 
 
Table 4.4. First, we explain the results for all the countries in the world. The survival 
rate had a positive effect on schooling in all models. This finding is consistent with the 
Ben-Porath mechanism, that is, longer lifetime working hours increase the educational 
return and educational investment. In addition, the longer lifetime may promote 
education to finance consumption after retirement. Further, life expectancy at 0 years 
also had a positive effect on education. We used life expectancy at 0 years to check the 
robustness of the results. Although we should use the adult mortality rate to test the 
Ben-Porath effect, retirement age may not affect the educational investment of people 
working in agriculture in developing countries. 
Second, the fertility rate had a negative effect on schooling in all samples.8 This 
result indicates the quality–quantity trade-off between fertility and education. That is, 
the number of children decreases educational investment per child, which is consistent 
with Prettner et al. (2012). In addition, both Educ 65-years and Educ 70-years had a 
positive effect on educational attainment. This finding indicates that parental preference 
for child education promotes educational attainment, consistent with Leker and 
Ponthiere (2015). GDP per capita had a positive and significant effect on schooling at 
25–29 years in all countries and a positive, but not significant effect in the case of 30–
34 years. Hence, an increase in household income promotes educational investment.  
The capacity of educational institutions also had a positive effect on education. 
This variable is measured as the ratio of the size of enrollment and population of the 
cohort, and we use it to represent the availability of educational institutions. This result 
is consistent with Currie and Moretti (2003). In addition, we analyze OECD countries to 
check the robustness of the effect of adult mortality on education. According to the 
results, the survival rate and life expectancy had a positive effect on schooling except at 
25–29 years. However, in OECD countries, GDP had a negative effect on schooling (not 
significant). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we analyzed the determinants of educational attainment, taking into 
consideration the adult mortality rate, fertility rate, and parental education. We showed 
that the adult mortality rate positively affects educational attainment, whereas the 
                                                     
8 Although there is a possibility that the interaction effect between fertility and income exists, we 
would like to treat this as a future issue. 
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fertility rate has a negative effect. The former indicates that the higher survival rate at 
retirement promotes educational investment by increasing the educational return 
through longer lifetime working hours. In addition, individuals finance consumption 
and expenses by saving lifetime income induced by higher educational attainment; 
hence, longer life expectancy may promote education through lifecycle behavior. The 
latter indicates that the increase in the number of children decreases educational 
investment per child, highlighting the quality–quantity trade-off between education and 
fertility. 
From our results, educational investment will become more important in ageing or 
low fertility societies. Some previous studies have shown that educational attainment 
promotes economic growth, while the decline in fertility promotes educational 
investment per child. Therefore, the positive effect of the decline in fertility on 
education is an important growth mechanism in low fertility societies. In ageing 
societies, population ageing is a reason for lower economic growth. However, in ageing 
societies that have a higher educational return through a longer lifetime working period, 
education is also an important factor. In addition, taking account of the longer 
retirement period, education is more important from the perspective of preparing for 
uncertain future income or expenses. 
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Table 4.1 Definition of the variables 
  
Variable name         Variable definition 
 
Educ 25–29 years          Log of the average years of total education (25–29 years) 
 
Educ 30–34 years          Log of the average years of total education (30–34 years) 
 
Survival                 Survival rate at 65 years (10-year lag) 
 
Lifeex                   Log of life expectancy at birth (10-year lag) 
 
Fertility                 Total fertility rate (10-year lag) 
 
Educ 65- years            Log of the average years of total education (older than 65 years) 
 
Educ 70- years            Log of the average years of total education (older than 70 years) 
 
GDP                    Log of GDP per capita (constant 2011 US dollars) (10-year lag) 
 
Capacity 25–29 years      15-lagged enrollment / population 25–29 years 
 
Capacity 30–34 years     20-lagged enrollment / population 30–34 years 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
World 
 
Mean Standard deviation Max Min 
Educ 25–29 years 9.26 3.09 1.39 14.70 
Educ 30–34 years 8.98 3.23 1.18 14.57 
Educ 65- years 4.96 3.33 0.14 13.40 
Educ 70- years 4.84 3.30 0.13 13.28 
Survival 69.62 15.57 22.24 88.64 
Lifeex 67.62 10.27 31.72 81.16 
Fertility 3.36 1.92 1.15 7.63 
GDP 13741 16991.62 251.58 81732.45 
Capacity 25–29 years 2.15 0.64 0.32 4.25 
Capacity 30–34 years 2.07 0.66 0.22 4.74 
Obs. 273 273 273 273 
OECD 
 
Mean Standard deviation Max Min 
Educ 25–29 years 12.02 1.18 8.50 14.70 
Educ 30–34 years 11.95 1.28 7.57 14.57 
Educ 65- years 8.19 2.46 2.78 13.40 
Educ 70- years 8.03 2.53 2.60 13.28 
Survival 82.05 4.74 69.24 88.64 
Lifeex 75.86 2.76 68.01 81.16 
Fertility 1.77 0.46 1.15 4.02 
GDP 29908 15834.34 4784.84 81732.45 
Capacity 25–29 years 2.60 0.30 1.52 3.27 
Capacity 30–34 years 2.45 0.28 1.45 3.20 
Obs. 94 94 94 94 
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Table 4.3 Empirical results (World) 
 
Notes: 1. Coefficient values are shown on the left side and t-values are shown in parentheses. 
      2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
      3. We used data on 105 countries. 
     
 
 
 
 
Independent variable Log Educ 25–29 years Log Educ 30–34 years 
Survival 0.003(1.90)*  0.005(2.69)***  
Log Lifeex  0.37(2.48)**  0.44(2.22)** 
Fertility -0.04 (-3.64)*** -0.04(-3.06)*** -0.05(-3.23)*** -0.05(-2.88)*** 
Log Educ 65 years 0.19(7.84)*** 0.18(7.83)***   
Log Educ 70 years   0.10(3.36)*** 0.10(3.53)*** 
Log GDP 0.04(2.56)** 0.04 (2.50)** 0.05(1.46) 0.05(1.65) 
Capacity 25–29 years 0.13 (5.84)*** 0.13(5.75)***   
Capacity 30–34 years   0.10(3.49)*** 0.10(3.29)*** 
Constant 1.20(7.78)*** -0.14(-0.23) 0.05(1.46) -0.34(-0.42) 
R-sq     
within 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.47 
between 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.85 
overall 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Obs. 273 273 273 273 
Hausman Random effect Random effect Fixed effect Fixed effect 
Chi^2(p) 3.98 (0.55) 5.37(0.37) 16.89(0.00) 16.00(0.01) 
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Table 4.4 Empirical results (OECD) 
Notes: 1. Coefficient values are shown on the left side and t-values are shown in parentheses. 
      2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
      3. We used data on 31 OECD countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variable Log Educ 25–29 years Log Educ 30–34 years 
Survival 0.005(1.54)  0.006(2.17)**  
Log Lifeex  0.55(1.46)  0.82(2.35)** 
Fertility -0.04 (-1.84)* -0.04(-1.71)* -0.07(-2.95)*** -0.06(-2.71)*** 
Log Educ 65 years 0.19(6.55)*** 0.19(6.31)***   
Log Educ 70 years   0.17(6.02)*** 0.16(5.77)*** 
Log GDP -0.03(-1.40) -0.03 (-1.32) -0.03(-1.22) -0.03(-1.28) 
Capacity 25–29 years 0.06 (2.29)** 0.06(2.10)**   
Capacity 30–34 years   0.09(3.21)*** 0.08(2.96)*** 
Constant 2.001 (10.69)*** -0.02(-0.01) 1.87(9.58)*** -1.16(-0.87) 
R-sq     
within 0.45 0.45 0.56 0.56 
between 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.71 
overall 0.46 0.46 0.55 0.54 
Obs. 94 94 94 94 
Hausman Random effect Random effect Random effect Random effect 
Chi^2(p) 2.44(0.79) 2.82(0.73) 4.44 (0.48) 3.66 (0.60) 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of marital status, saving 
behavior among the elderly, and educational attainment, all under the societal conditions 
of low fertility and aging. In a low-fertility and aging society, these issues closely and 
interdependently relate, and so we conducted some theoretical and empirical analyses of 
them. First, we conducted an empirical analysis of the interrelationships among marital 
status, fertility rate, and other socioeconomic factors in Japan. Our empirical model is 
based on the theory of Becker (1960, 1974), and we make use of a simultaneous 
equation that includes marital status and fertility, in conjunction with the two-stage least 
squares method.  
The results show that marital status has a positive effect on fertility rate, as 
expected. This result indicates that a decreasing marriage rate since the 1990s has led to 
a fertility decline in Japan. As for male employment status, the male regular 
employment rate has also had a positive effect on both marital status and fertility rates: 
the results indicate that an increase in the number of male nonregular workers has since 
the 2000s reduced both the marital status and fertility rates. Taking into account the 
negative effect of marital status on fertility, improvements in the male employment 
status are more important. In addition, we used convenience store as a variable, to 
indicate comparative advantages in household product activity between men and 
women; this is based on the methodology of Becker (1974). Convenience stores, in 
particular, reduce the necessity for single men’s household products, and so the variable 
convenience store is expected to affect those conditions that underpin Becker’s theory. 
The number of convenience stores was found to have a negative effect on male marital 
status, and so the results showed that a change in lifestyle is also a reason for the decline 
in the rate of marital status. 
Co-residence between unmarried adult children and parents has been increasing 
since the 2000s, particularly in Japan. The co-residence rate has had a negative effect on 
male marital status, and this indicates that the necessity for marriage has declined on 
account of parental supports for single men. In analyses of the co-residence rate, 
parental assets were found to have a positive effect on the co-residence rate, and so it is 
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thought that children depend on parental assets and tend not to marry. On the other hand, 
the results also showed that co-residence was also promoted even in cases where 
parental assets had decreased. Following the bubble economy of the early 1990s, the 
parents of many younger people have become financially poor; therefore, it is thought 
that parents have grown to rely on the support of their children, and that the 
co-residence rate has increased for this reason. Therefore, to eliminate economic 
barriers to marriage among youth, in addition to providing supports that allow younger 
generations to be more independent, Japan needs to provide financial supports or 
nursing benefits to elderly households. 
According to these results, the assets of elderly people affect the marital status or 
livings standard of younger people, and asset accumulation among elderly people is 
expected to have a large influence on saving-rate trends; this would be the case, in 
particular, in aging societies such as Japan. In Chapter 3, we develop two period 
life-cycle models that include the survival rate and bequest motives; we also conduct 
empirical analyses of asset accumulation among elderly people, based on a life-cycle 
model. Data are at the micro level and pertain to elderly people in Japan, and we use the 
health status of elderly people as a variable that pertains to the survival rate in the senior 
years (i.e., aged 65 or more). According to the results, the sample is divided into a 
healthy subsample and an unhealthy subsample. In additional analyses, we use the 
interaction term of the health dummy and each variable, as well as other variables, to 
determine the effect of health status on asset accumulation. Our results theoretically and 
empirically show that health status and bequest motives promote asset accumulation. 
The results also show that while unhealthy people save money for bequests, among 
healthy people, the bequest motive is not an important determinant factor vis-à-vis asset 
accumulation. This finding is consistent with the theoretical model, and it indicates that 
healthy people save more money for future consumption or medical expenses than for 
bequests.  
However, there is the possibility that future uncertainty in this way obstructs 
optimal consumption among elderly people. Therefore, from the perspective of 
increasing consumption among elderly people, policy is needed that removes future 
uncertainty and promotes consumption among this subsection of the population. Public 
pensions have had a positive effect on asset accumulation, and this result is consistent 
with the explanation offered by Horioka (2010b). This result aligns with the assertion 
that the reduction of public pension funds has led since the 2000s to a lower saving rate 
among elderly households, and that the stability of public pension funds is critical to 
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viable economic conditions among elderly people. In terms of robustness, there is an 
endogeneity issue between health status and asset accumulation, and it very much needs 
to be addressed in the future. 
Educational attainment is also an important issue with regards to economic growth, 
and many studies discuss the relationship between these two factors. In addition, both 
the average years of schooling and life expectancy have increased globally in recent 
years. In Chapter 4, we undertake an empirical analysis of educational attainment by 
using country-level panel data that focus on the effects of longevity and fertility on 
educational attainment. We take a 10-year lag for each variable to determine the effect 
in the schooling decision-making period, and our empirical model is based on that of 
Prettner et al. (2012). We add to this model the adult mortality rate, which acts as a 
variable that represents lifetime working hours, as Ben-Porath (1967) explains. 
According to our results, the average number of years of schooling among elderly 
individuals positively affect educational attainment among younger individuals. Indeed, 
there is a multiplier effect in education between older generations and younger 
generations, and so educational investment is critical to educational attainment among 
younger generations. As for the effects of longevity and fertility on education, first, a 
lower adult mortality rate has been found to have a positive effect on educational 
attainment; this suggests that longer lifetime working hours promotes the demand for 
educational investment. The reduced adult mortality rate is also expected to extend the 
length of “senior hood,” and so there is the possibility that educational investment is 
promoted so as to prepare for future uncertainty. Second, the results also show that the 
fertility rate has a negative effect on educational attainment; this finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis of there being a quality–quantity tradeoff between education and 
fertility. This indicates that in a low-fertility society—like Japan—an increase in human 
capital per child is more important to economic growth. Therefore, particularly in 
low-fertility and aging societies, the supply of public education should be increased, the 
scholarship system improved, or both, to correspond to higher demand for educational 
investment. 
Although we explain the possibility that a decline in fertility promotes economic 
growth through an increase in human capital, over the long term, the fertility decline is 
an important problem in terms of economic growth. In addition, education is found to 
have negative effect on marital status, among women and men alike; therefore, 
education may promote a decline in fertility, through a decline in marital status. 
Well-educated women will hesitate to get married, as marriage tends to increased 
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housework burden reduced work hours among women. Therefore, the provision of 
childcare and/or employment supports for career-oriented women will be important in 
schooling-oriented societies such as Japan.  
As for education among men, Kitamura and Miyazaki (2011) show that education 
reduces the marriage rate among men in their twenties to early thirties, but that 
education promotes marriage in the late thirties. As we analyzed only subjects aged 20–
39 years, there is the possibility that more highly educated men delay marriage during 
their schooling period, but “catch up” later on. However, it is thought that lowering the 
age at first marriage is important, even in the case of men. According to Ota (2012), 
increased education levels caused job scarcity among graduates, by increasing the 
number of incompetent students, and it is expected that since the 2000s, a decrease in 
employment rate among university graduates has affected male marital status. Therefore, 
we should develop employment supports for university students and reduce supply–
demand mismatches in employment between graduates and firms. Finally, while 
educational investment is an important factor, coping with the negative effects of 
education on marital or fertility decline is more important, particularly in developed 
countries like Japan. 
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Appendix A.    Empirical results by fixed effects (without 2SLS) 
Notes: 1. Coefficient values are shown on the left side, and t-values are shown in parentheses.  
      2. * ,**, and*** indicate significance at 10% , 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 3. The Hausman test of fixed-effect 2SLS determines fixed effect or random effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Married FMarried Con Fertility Flabor Co-R FCo-R
Married -2.46***(-3.71)
FMarried 0.94***(4.31)
Con -0.02***(-2.90) -0.02 (-1.49) 0.05 (0.60) 0.36* (1.83) 0.40 (1.03)
Fertility -0.46***(-3.54)
Flabor -0.13***(-5.65) -0.11***(-4.77) -0.81***(-4.08) -0.58***(-11.99) 1.01** (2.36)
Co-R -0.04***(-5.48)
FCo-R -0.02***(-5.70) -0.03***(-3.15)
Labor  0.26*** (6.05) 0.24***(6.71) 1.29***(3.15) 0.56***(6.29) -2.42***(-9.44)
Edu -0.16***(-4.49) 2.88***(4.43)
FEdu -0.16***(-5.53) -0.16** (-2.30) 4.99***(7.50)
Wage  0.11 (1.37) 0.10 (1.20)
FWage -0.09 (-1.20) 0.07 (0.80)
Road -0.13**(-2.40)
Residence -2.33***(-5.84)
LRS 0.01 (0.14)
Nursery -0.07 (-0.92)
Three-generation 0.02 (0.32) 1.20***(12.77)
FPW -0.31 (-1.44)
PI 0.52**(2.43) -1.13**(-2.08) -2.10**(-1.88)
Assets -13.14***(-3.05) -10.12 (-1.22)
Assets 2 1.57***(3.06) 1.20 (1.21)
Housing 5.57***(7.10)
Constant term -1.35*** (-2.99) -1.95***(-3.98) 6.63***(3.37) 0.41 (1.50) 0.44 (0.19) 38.08***(4.40) 46.39**(2.66)
Hausman test  Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect
R-sq
with in 0.77 0.94 0.19 0.83 0.94 0.88 0.83
between 0.54 0.45 0.59 0.22 0.61 0.0005 0.17
overall 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.12 0.23
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Appendix B.    Empirical results fixed effects 2SLS (Robustness check) 
 
 
Notes: 1. Coefficient values are shown on the left side, and t-values are shown in parentheses 
      2. * ,**, ***and  indicate significance at 10%, 5% , and 1% levels, respectively. 
     3. In the bottom line of the table, chi-square values are presented, and their p-values are shown in parentheses 
 
 
 
 Married FMarried Con Fertility Flabor 
Married   -3.88(-3.10)***    
FMarried    2.24(9.79)***   
Con -0.09 (-1.68)* -0.03 (-0.57)     
Fertility      -0.35(-2.00)** 
Flabor -0.10(-2.60)*** -0.12(-3.30)*** -0.89(-3.53)*** -0.53(-7.46)*** -0.76(-8.94)***  
Labor 0.29(4.62)*** 0.24(4.83)*** 1.64(3.41)*** 0.35(3.25)*** 0.88(7.82)***  
Edu -0.41(-6.19)***      
FEdu  -0.25(-8.72)***   -0.58(-8.67)***  
Wage 0.03(0.23) 0.09(0.89)  -0.09(-0.42) 0.03(0.11)  
FWage -0.003(-0.04) 0.02(0.30)  0.01(0.04) 0.07(0.37)  
Road   -0.11(-2.04)**    
Residence   -2.25(-4.82)***    
LRS   -0.06(-0.53)    
Three-generation    0.06(1.06) 0.004(0.07) 1.19(12.85)*** 
FPW      -0.29(-1.36) 
Housing      5.74(7.29)*** 
PI      0.49(2.33)** 
Constant term -1.72(-2.11)** -1.84(-2.68)*** 5.28(2.00)** 2.22 (1.76)* -1.37(-1.05) 0.37((0.16) 
Hausman test Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect 
Chi^2 (p) 44.20(0.00) 13.61(0.03) 7.20(0.30) 123.69(0.00) 123.74(0.00) 295.68(0.00) 
R-sq: with in 0.70 0.92 0.18 0.75 0.70 0.94 
between 0.49 0.36 0.61 0.28 0.25 0.61 
overall 0.47 0.46 0.60 0.32 0.29 0.24 
Sample size 141 141 141 141 141 141 
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Appendix C.  Solution of optimal consumption and assets 
The utility function and lifetime budget constraints are shown as follows. 
U=ln𝐶1
∗ + 
𝑞2
(1+𝜌 )
ln𝐶2
∗                                           (3.1) 
 𝐴1=(1+r)𝐴0+𝑌1 − 𝐶1                                                    (3.2)  
0 = (1+r)𝐴1+𝑌2 − 𝐶2                                                    (3.3)  
The Lagrangian function is written as  
L= ln𝐶1
∗+
𝑞2
(1+𝜌 )
ln𝐶2
∗+λ {(1+r)
2
A0 + (1+r) (Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C2}              (3.10) 
Solving the first-order conditions and using budget constraints, optimal consumption is 
obtained. The optimal consumptions 𝐶1
∗ and 𝐶2
∗ are shown as follows. 
𝐶1
∗ = 
(1+𝜌) (1+𝑟)
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝐴0+ 
1+𝜌 
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝑌1 + 
1+𝜌
(1+𝑟)(1+𝜌 +𝑞2)
𝑌2                           (3.11) 
𝐶2
∗ = 
(1+r)
2
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝐴0+
(1+𝑟)
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝑌1 + 
1
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝑌2                                   (3.12) 
Substituting 𝐶1
∗  and 𝐶2
∗  into budget constraints, the assets of the first period are 
obtained: 
𝐴1 = 
𝑞2 (1+𝑟)
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝐴0+ 
𝑞2 
1+𝜌 +𝑞2
𝑌1 −  
1+𝜌
(1+𝑟)(1+𝜌 +𝑞2)
𝑌2                               (3.4) 
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Appendix D. Solution of optimal consumption and assets (including the 
bequest motive) 
The Lagrangian function is shown as follows. 
L=ln𝐶1
∗+ 
𝑞2
(1+ρ) 
ln𝐶2
∗ + (1−𝑞2) k ln𝐴1
∗  + 
𝑞2
(1+ρ )
k ln𝐴2
∗ +λ1{(1+r) A0+Y1 − C1 
−A1} +λ2{(1+r)
2
A0 + (1+r) (Y1 − C1) +Y2 − C2 − A2}                     (3.13) 
where λ1and λ2 are Lagrangian multipliers, and k refers to the bequest motive. 
The first-order condition is shown as 
     
1
C1
= λ1 + (1+r) λ2                                              (3.14) 
     
𝑞2
(1+ρ )
1
C2
= λ2                                                    (3.15) 
     (1 - 𝑞2) k 
1
A1
 = λ1                                               (3.16) 
     
𝑞2
(1+ρ )
 k 
1
A2
 = λ2                                                  (3.17) 
From the budget constraint and first order condition, the following equation is obtained. 
1
A1
 = 
1
(1- 𝑞2)k
 
1
(1+r) A0+Y1-A1
－
𝑞2(1+𝑟)
(1- 𝑞2)(1+ρ )
 
1+𝑘
𝑘
 
1
(1+r) A1+Y2
                          (3.9) 
Taking the derivative of 
1
A1
, following equation is obtained.  
d𝐴1
dk
=
1
(1 −  𝑞2)𝑘2
{
1
(1 + r) 𝐴0 + 𝑌1 − 𝐴1
 −    
𝑞2(1 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝜌 )((1 + r) 𝐴1 + 𝑌2) 
}
1
𝐴1
2  +  
1
(1 −  𝑞2)𝑘 {(1 + r) 𝐴0 + 𝑌1 − 𝐴1}2
 +  
1 + 𝑘
𝑘
𝑞2(1 + 𝑟)2
(1 −  𝑞2)(1 + 𝜌 ){(1 + r) 𝐴1 + 𝑌2}2
 
Here, the denominator is positive, but ambiguous. Therefore, 
d𝐴1
dk
>0 if 
1
(1+r) 𝐴0+𝑌1−𝐴1
 −    
𝑞2(1+𝑟)
(1+𝜌 )((1+r) 𝐴1+𝑌2) 
 >0, or, 𝑞2 < 
 (1+ρ)
(1+r  )
C2+A2
C1
. 
61 
 
Appendix E Sample countries 
Here is the list of the countries included in the analysis: 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep. Kuwait, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
The list of OECD countries is as follows: 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States 
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